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1 Introduction
Under which conditions do marginally progressive income tax schedules
emerge? The economic literature has tried to answer this question by re-
sorting either to a normative or a positive approach. The normative ap-
proach assumes that tax policies are chosen by a benevolent planner, whose
objective is to maximize social welfare under informational and incentive
constraints. Unfortunately, this approach has proven inconclusive on the
shape of the optimal tax function (for a recent account, see Myles, 2000). A
notable exception is when the planner’s objective is to choose a “fair” tax
schedule. Indeed, Young (1990) has shown that the equal sacrifice require-
ment implies progressive taxation.
The positive approach, to whom this paper clearly belongs, stresses the
fact that tax schedules are, directly or indirectly, chosen democratically by
self-interested voters. The primary objective of the paper is to provide
conditions for progressivity (in the sense of convex tax functions) to emerge
as a voting outcome. More precisely, we analyze voting outcomes and their
dependence on the underlying distribution of abilities in presence of tax
disincentives. We specify the disincentive effect of taxation in such a way
that the revenue-maximizing tax schedule is regressive. The idea is that if
progressivity can emerge as politicial equilibrium in this most unfavorable
environment, then modifying tax disincentives can only make progressivity
more likely.
The main difficulty in applying voting theory to (non-linear) income
taxation resides in the multi-dimensionality of the policy space and in its
consequences on the existence of an equilibrium. It is well known that the
aggregation, by means of majority voting, of transitive individual preferences
on a multi-dimensional set of options often results in a non-transitive social
preference. In most cases, there is no majority (or Condorcet) winner, i.e.
no option that is preferred by a majority to any other feasible option.
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Like many papers in the domain1, we address this issue by reducing the
dimensionality of the policy space. More precisely, we confine the analysis
to quadratic tax schedules, including either convex, concave or linear tax
functions (like Roemer,1999 and Cukierman and Meltzer, 1991). This is of
course an important restriction since it rules out tax schedules with non-
monotone marginal tax rates (like in Roell, 1997). However it allows us to
reduce the dimensionality of the voting space to a manageable number. This
restriction is not sufficient in itself to guarantee the existence of a majority
winner. Indeed Cukierman and Meltzer (1991) using a similar model show
that rather strong conditions are required for the existence of a majority
winner and for that equilibrium to involve progressive taxes. So in spite of
the restriction to quadratic tax schedules and unless we impose very strong
additional restrictions, there is no majority equilibrium and vote cycles are
almost inevitable.
We use three different approaches to bypass the problem of the non
existence of a majority winner.2 In the first approach, we restrict the pol-
icy space to tax schedules that are ideal for some voter (Section 3). We
show by means of simulations that there exists a majority equilibrium on
this restricted voting space and that it involves progressivity when the dis-
tribution of abilities is concentrated around the middle.3 In the second
approach, developed in Section 4, we keep the entire policy space but adopt
less demanding political equilibrium concepts in a simultaneous two-party
competition game, namely the uncovered set (elimination of weakly domi-
1Romer (1975) reduces the policy space to linear tax schedules and obtains a Condorcet
winner involving average progressivity (see also Roberts (1977)). Berliant and Gouveia
(1994) introduce uncertainty over the income distribution and then use the ex-ante bud-
get balance requirement to reduce the policy space so that a Condorcet winner exists.
Snyder and Kramer(1988) assume that candidates cannot credibly commit to implement
something different from their most-preferred policy and thus restrict the policy space to
the policies that are ideal for some voter.
2We do not investigate in this paper the probabilistic voting approach according to
which voters who are the most affected by a tax change are the more likely to vote. This
sort of randomness facilitates the existence of a majority equilibrium (see Hinich et al,
1972).
3Snyder and Kramer (1988) obtain a similar result with a different model.
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nated strategies) and the bipartisan set (mixed-strategy equilibrium).4 In
the third approach we consider a sequential two-party competition due to
Kramer (1977) in which political parties propose policies that maximize their
vote shares.5 We determine the vote-maximizing trajectory and show that
it converges to a relatively small cycle.
Simulating the model for different distributions of abilities, we show
that the second and third approaches narrow down significantly the set of
equilibria and tend to select mostly progressive taxes when the distribution
of abilities is concentrated around the middle.
2 The Model
2.1 Tax Functions
Following the optimal income tax tradition, we consider a two-good economy
(consumption and labor) populated by a large number of individuals who
differ only in their ability. Each individual is characterized by her ability
to earn income, w ∈ [0, 1]. The distribution of ability in the population
is described by a strictly increasing cumulative distribution function F on
[0, 1], so that F (w) is the fraction of the population with ability less than
or equal to w. The average ability level is
w =
Z 1
0
wdF (w) (1)
and the median ability level is
wm = F
−1(
1
2
). (2)
We assume throughout that wm ≤ w in order to generate positively
skewed income distributions as typically observed in real world. Individuals
4See De Donder et al.(2000) for a presentation and a set-theoretical comparison of these
different solution concepts. See also De Donder(2000) for an application to redistributive
issues. All these concepts are Condorcet-consistent in the sense that they uniquely select
the Condorcet winner whenever it exists.
5Hettich and Winer (1988) follow a similar approach in a model in which political
parties propose nonlinear taxes to maximize their vote share. However work disincentives
are not present in their model.
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choose the amount of labor they sell on a competitive market and receive
a wage rate equal to their ability. The production sector exhibits constant-
returns-to-scale so that the wage rate is constant. Then an individual with
ability w 6= 0 who supplies y/w units of labor earns pre-tax income y. Her
after-tax income is
x(y, t) = y − t(y) (3)
where t(y) is a continuous tax function t : R+ → R. Note that we allow for
negative taxes.
Definition 1. A tax function is feasible if it satisfies the following condi-
tions,
t(y) ≤ y for all y ∈ R+ (4)
0 ≤ t0(y) ≤ 1 for all y ∈ R+ (5)Z 1
0
t(y(w))dF (w) = 0 (6)
Condition (4) says that tax liabilities cannot exceed taxable income. Con-
dition (5) implies that both tax liabilities and after-tax income are non-
decreasing functions of pre-tax income.6 The budget balance condition (6)
means that income taxation is purely redistributive (i.e., zero revenue re-
quirement).
Our primary objective is to understand when progressive taxation emerges
as a voting outcome. We adopt the following definition of progressivity.7
Definition 2: A tax schedule is (marginally) progressive if and only if
t(y) is a convex function (i.e. marginal tax rates are monotonically increas-
ing).
6This condition is usually derived instead of assumed in the optimal income tax liter-
ature with endogenous labor supply.
7As suggested by one referee by allowing for negative taxes our definition of progressiv-
ity (marginal progressivity) does not necessarily correspond to the more usual definition of
progressivity in terms of increasing average tax rates (average progressivity) which gives
a better indication of the level of redistribution. But since the objective of this paper
is to understand the prevalence of (weakly) convex tax function rather than the level of
redistribution, the concept of marginal progressivity seems more appropriate.
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The set of potential tax schedules is infinitely dimensional. To limit the
voting problem to a manageable number of dimensions we shall thereafter
restrict attention to the quadratic income tax function:8
t(y) = −c+ by + ay2 (7)
where c ≥ 0 is the uniform lump-sum transfer, b is the flat tax parameter
(with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1) and a is the progressivity tax parameter, with a > 0
indicating a (marginally) progressive income tax and a < 0 representing
a (marginally) regressive one. As will become clear shortly, the feasibility
conditions (4) and (5) impose the following lower and upper bounds on the
progressivity parameter: −b2 ≤ a ≤
1−b
2 . Essentially, the upper bound on
progressivity ensures that the marginal tax rate is less than one at the top
(and thus everywhere) and the lower bound on regressivity guarantees that
marginal tax rate is positive at the top (and thus everywhere). Combining
(6) and (7) yields
c = by + ay2 (8)
where y =
R
y(w) dF (w) and y2 =
R
y2(w) dF (w). Hence, tax policies are
bidimensional. Let the set of feasible tax policies be T =
©
(a, b) ∈ [−b2 ,
1−b
2 ]× [0, 1]
ª
.
Plugging (7) and (8) into (3) the after-tax income (consumption) of an indi-
vidual with pre-tax income y resulting from a tax policy (a, b) ∈ T is given
by
x = y + (1− b)(y − y)− a(y2 − y2) (9)
2.2 Preferences
The underlying preferences of any individual with ability w are represented
by a utility function u(x, y;w). Given the tax policy (a, b), an individual
with ability w chooses pre-tax income y that maximizes u(x, y;w) subject
to (9). Throughout we assume the following quasi-linear utility function,
8The quadratic tax function has been studied before in a voting context by Cukierman
and Meltzer (1991) with endogenous incomes and by Roemer (1999) with exogenous in-
comes. Note that quadratic taxation can be viewed as a second-order Taylor expansion of
a more general class of schedules.
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u(x, y;w) = x− 1
2
³ y
w
´2
. (10)
This formulation of preferences simplifies the analysis as there is no income
effect on the labor supply decision (all income effects are absorbed by con-
sumption) and everyone chooses to work (because the marginal disutility of
labor is zero when not working). While this is a highly restrictive specifi-
cation of preferences, it captures in a simple manner the incentive effects
of taxes (consumption-leisure trade-off), thus making it more general than
models with fixed income (e.g., Roemer, 1999). It is also considerably more
tractable than the general specification of Cukierman-Meltzer (1991), allow-
ing us to obtain clear, intuitive results.9
Using this specification of preferences, for each tax policy (a, b) ∈ T an
individual with ability w will choose a pre-tax income10
y(a, b;w) = (1− b) w
2
1 + 2aw2
. (11)
Hence marginal tax progressivity (a > 0) reduces the pre-tax income
of everyone. Moreover because progressivity discourages more the labor
supply of high-ability than low-ability individuals, the dispersion of pre-
tax income decreases. Note also that for each (a, b) ∈ T pre-tax income
is increasing with ability. Therefore for any admissible tax schedule the
ranking of incomes is the same as the ranking of abilities.
Given the optimal labor choices the upper bound on progressivity and
the lower bound on regressivity ensure that any tax policy (a, b) ∈ T satisfies
the conditions (4) to (6).11
9Some recent empirical studies also support our quasi-linearity assumption. For in-
stance Blundell et al. (1998) report very low income elasticities of labour supply.
10With regressive taxation the budget set is not convex but the lower bound imposed
on the degree of regressivity is sufficient relative to the degree of concavity of the utility
function to ensure that the optimal labor supply choice is unique for all ability levels
w ∈ [0, 1] and tax policies (a, b) ∈ T .
11The proof of this statement is available upon request.
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Resorting to numerical simulations for various ability distributions, we
further get that in this model the lump sum tranfer c is globally maximized
with regressive taxes. So the poor would prefer marginal regressivity. This
is a consequence of the labor-enhancing effect of regressive taxation. Lower
tax rates on the rich induce them to earn more and eventually pay more
taxes that can then be redistributed to the poor.
Preferences over tax policies are given by the indirect utility function.
Substituting (3), (7) and (11) into (10) the indirect utility function of an
individual with ability w over a tax policy (a, b) is
v(a, b;w) = c+ (1− b)2 ω(a)
2
. (12)
where ω(a) = w
2
1+2aw2
and from (8) c is a function of the tax policy
(a, b) ∈ T and the distribution of ability F (w). Since ω(a) is increasing in
w for all (a, b) ∈ T it follows that higher ability individuals get higher utility
for any admissible tax schedule.
2.3 Voting over quadratic tax schemes
We now turn to the voting problem over (non-linear) tax policies (a, b) ∈ T .
A majority (or Condorcet) winning tax policy is a pair (a, b) that is preferred
by a majority of individuals to any other feasible pair (a0, b0) ∈ T . The
natural first step is to examine if such a majority winning tax policy exists.
Previous research has delivered several sufficient conditions for the existence
of majority voting equilibrium. When the decision is unidimensional either
single-crossing or single-peakedness of preferences is sufficient (Roberts 1977;
Gans and Smart 1996). Unfortunately single-crossing and single-peakedness
do not extend to our two-dimensional issue space since there is in general
no way to rank multi-dimensional tax schedules in a transitive order.
The absence of voting equilibrium when taxation is multidimensional is
more readily described when income is fixed. In this case, Marhuenda and
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Ortuno-Ortin(1995) have shown that, starting with any tax schedule, there
always exists a majority support for more (marginal) progressivity when the
median income is lower than the mean income. This move towards more
progressivity is supported by the low income individuals, who thereby shift
the burden of taxation towards higher income tax payers. On the other
hand, Hindriks(2001) has also shown, using quadratic tax functions, that
there always exists a majority support for less progressivity. This tax reform
is supported by a coalition of the rich and the poor as a way to shift the
burden of taxation towards the middle income group. Put together, these
two results imply inevitable voting cycles between progressive and regressive
taxes12 along which majority coalitions of the poor and the middle class
alternate with majority coalitions of the poor and the rich.13
Allowing for endogenous income, and thus distortionary taxation, does
not alleviate the existence problem of a Condorcet winner.14 Facing this
problem, one possibility is to find conditions over ability distributions and
voter preferences such that a Condorcet winner emerges. This is the route
taken by Cukierman and Meltzer (1991) with quadratic tax functions. The
conditions they obtain seem unsurprisingly very restrictive.15
12Notice that it is not possible to follow Gans and Smart (1996) in restricting our
analysis to a family of non-linear tax schedules that cross only once so as to reduce the
multi-dimensional tax schedules into a one-dimensional index of progressivity (see also
Berliant and Gouveia, 1994). Indeed, doing so would create a bias in favor of progressivity
and the middle-class since a coalition of the rich and poor can only form in our model by
proposing a tax schedule crossing twice from below the existing one.
13Both Marhuenda and Ortuno-Ortin(1995) and Hindriks(2001) assume that it is al-
ways possible to construct either more progressive or less progressive tax scheme than
the existing one. Making some reasonable restrictions on the admissible tax schedule, De
Donder and Hindriks(2002) show that with fixed income individuals display corner pref-
erences over tax schedules and that it is then easier to obtain a Condorcet winner since
many deviations are ruled out. They also give necessary and sufficient conditions for a
Condorcet winner to exist, and show that if it exists it entails maximum progressivity.
14 Indeed, as we show in section 3, with distortionary taxation individuals have interior
preference for tax schedules. This makes the existence of a Condorcet winner more difficult
to obtain than with fixed income.
15They do not provide examples of preferences and distribution functions satisfying
these conditions. Indeed, the non-existence of a Condorcet winner in our highly stylized
model (which uses the same quadratic tax schedules and very simple preferences and
ability distributions) casts doubt on the possibility for their conditions to be met in a
more general context.
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This paper investigates other ways to face the existence problem of a
Condorcet winner. More precisely, the following three sections offer three
different approaches. In section 3, we reduce the set of admissible tax func-
tions to those which are most preferred by some voter. In section 4, we
introduce simultaneous political competition between two parties only in-
terested in getting elected, and we study both their weakly undominated
strategies (uncover set) and their mixed strategy equilibrium (bipartisan
set). In section 5, we allow for sequential political competition and study
the trajectory of equilibrium strategies. For each approach we analyze the
equilibrium outcomes and their comparative statics with respect to changes
in the underlying distribution of abilities. The central question is under
which conditions marginal progressivity is more likely to emerge as a voting
outcome.
Given the complexitity of the analysis we can only provide simulation
results. Throughout we shall adopt the beta distribution as the distribution
of ability. The beta distribution has two parameters (α > 0 and β > 0),
varying which can generate a wide variety of density functions with support
[0, 1].16 The beta distribution has mean α/(α + β) and variance αβ/[(1 +
α+ β)(α+ β)2]. If α > 1 and β > 1 the distribution is unimodal. If α < 1
and β < 1 it is U-shaped, while if α = β = 1 it is uniform. The degree
of skewness increases with the difference | α − β |. The beta function is
symmetric if α = β , positively skewed if α > β and negatively skewed if
α < β. If α ≤ 1 and β > 1 the density is J-shaped (monotonically increasing)
whereas if a > 1 and b ≤ 1 it is the opposite (monotonically decreasing).
Increasing both α and β increases the density around the median.
16The beta distribution has density f(w) = 1
B(α,β)w
α−1(1− w)β−1 (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) where
B(α,β) is the beta function that is defined by B(α,β) =
R 1
0
xα−1(1− x)β−1dx for α > 0
and β > 0.
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3 Reduction of the policy space
In this section, we restrict the policy space to the set of feasible tax sched-
ules that are most-preferred by some voter. This assumption seems a nat-
ural way to reduce the policy space, and has been adopted by Snyder and
Kramer (1988) enabling them to obtain a Condorcet winner with progressive
taxation.17 We can also defend this restriction along the line of the Citizens-
Candidates models by assuming that candidates, emerging from the set of
voters, cannot credibly commit to choose a policy different from their most
preferred policy (Osborne and Slivinsky 1996, Besley and Coate 1997).
As an illustration, in Figure 1 we have represented the most preferred
tax functions of the electorate for the beta distribution of ability with pa-
rameters α = 2, β = 5 (i.e., unimodal and skewed to the right).18 The
lowest-ability individual prefers the policy that maximizes c (i.e., the peak
of the Laffer surface). This is the most regressive tax schedule, with the
lowest a < 0 and the highest b, namely (a1, b1) = (−0.28, 0.55). The second
lowest-ability individual prefers the point just below (a2, b2) = (−0.25, 0.50)
and so on moving downwards as ability increases, trading off progressively
lower b for higher a. Then we reach the median ability individual who
prefers (am, bm) = (0.425, 0.15). Proceeding further we reach a voter close
to the mean who prefers a policy with b = 0 and maximum progressivity
a = 1/2. From that point on we move to the left along the horizontal axis
as ability increases, involving less and less progressivity as a goes down to
zero.19Ordering all the bliss points from left to right by increasing ability we
obtain that each voter displays single-peaked preferences over the resulting
set of bliss points. Therefore it follows from the median voter theorem that
17Their model differs however from ours in the sense that individuals do not respond to
taxation by substituting untaxable leisure to taxable labor, but rather by working in an
untaxed sector with lower wage rate.
18For this example, a and b vary by increment of 0.005 respectively in [− b2 ,
1−b
2 ]× [0, 1].
19Calculations with other ability distributions reveal a similar pattern of blisspoints
with a willingness to trade off less b for more a as ability rises until b = 0, then to decrease
a as ability further increases until the no taxation point (a, b) = (0, 0) is reached.
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the point preferred by the median ability individual is a majority winner.20
Since the median voter is in general in favor of progressivity we get a first
possible explanation to the prevalence of progressive taxation. Existence of
voting equilibrium over the set of blisspoints also obtains for different un-
derlying distributions of abilities. However when the distribution of ability
changes the median voter may change as well as the impact of tax on ag-
gregate revenue, modifying the equilibrium outcome as illustrated in Table
1.
Table 1. Majority winner (am, bm) over bliss points for various beta(α,β)
Beta(α,β) am bm
1,1 0.275 0
1,2 -0.075 0.35
2,2 0.25 0
2,3 0.475 0
2,4 0.5 0
2,5 0.425 0.15
2.5,2.5 0.225 0
2.5,3 0.35 0
2.5,4 0.5 0
2.5,5 0.5 0
3,3 0.225 0
3,4 0.325 0
3,5 0.5 0
Table 1 reveals that in most cases the median voter prefers progressiv-
ity (although the degree of progressivity may vary with the parameters of
the distribution of abilities). The only exception is the linearly decreasing
20 In the course of our research, Robin Boadway and John Weymark have brought to our
attention that a similar existence result has been derived by Roell (1997) under quasi-linear
preferences and one additional condition which she called minimum utility restriction.
This restriction requires that the lowest ability individual prefers the consumption-income
bundle of the median voter to the zero bundle. It appears however that this condition
cannot be satisfied in our model since the lowest ability is zero (so, making it infinitely
harmful for this individual to reach the median income level). Roell’s result is also driven
by the fact that in her model higher ability individuals prefer tax schedules that induce
more effort from everyone (see Theorem 6). This is not consistent with our model in
which the poor tend to support marginal regressivity which elicits more effort than the
marginal progressivity favored by the middle-class. Another key difference between the
two models is the feasible set. For instance in Roell the equilibrium outcome involves
negative marginal tax rates for some individuals below the median, which is not feasible
in our model.
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distribution of abilities (i.e., Beta(1, 2)) for which the median ability is so
low that the median voter prefers regressivity like the low-ability voters.
The existence of a majority winner over the bliss points deserves some
explanation. It is essentially due to the fact that the rich and the poor hav-
ing diametrically opposed ideal policies (pure redistribution) can no longer
compromise on a policy that is not optimal for one of them to defeat the
policy which is optimal for the median voter. This prevents the formation of
a coalition of the extremes and gives the decisive power to the median voter.
The remaining voters are evenly paired off against one another regarding
any move from the policy that is most-preferred by the voter with median
ability.21
In the following section, instead of restricting the vote to the most pre-
ferred tax functions we adopt weaker solution concepts in the context of a
standard Downsian political competition game.
4 Elimination of weakly dominated policies
We consider a Downsian voting game with two political parties competing to
win the election. Both parties simultaneously announce their tax schedule
which they commit to implement if elected. Each individual then votes for
the party whose platform is better according to her preferences. The party
receiving the most votes wins the election and imposes its platform as the
choice of the polity. In the event of ties, a fair coin decides which party wins
the election. Note that in contrast with Section 3, it is assumed here that
candidates can commit to any policy.
21To see this, fix the interior blisspoint of the median individual (with income ym > 0)
and suppose a small change in a from that point. Let db
da
be the associated change in b
required to maintain c constant. Then from the first-order condition and the envelope
theorem we have, ∂v(ym)/∂a = −( dbda + ym)ym = 0 which implies
db
da
= −ym. Using this
fact, it then follows that ∂v(y)/∂a = −( y − ym)y ≷ 0 for all y ≶ ym. Hence, voters on
each side of the median income disagree about the desired direction of change from the
policy preferred by the median voter.
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The majority preference P over any pair of tax schedules (t1, t2) ∈ T 2 is
given by,
t1Pt2 : n(t1, t2) > n(t2, t1)
t2Pt1 : n(t1, t2) < n(t2, t1),
where n(t1, t2) = #{w ∈ [0, 1] : v(t1;w) > v(t2;w)} is the number of voters
who (weakly) prefer t1 to t2, and n(t2, t1) = #{w ∈ [0, 1] : v(t1;w) <
v(t2;w)} is the number of voters who prefer t2 to t1.22
Assuming an odd number of voters, the majority preference relation is a
binary relation satisfying the asymmetry and completeness properties of a
tournament.
The objectives assigned to the parties are crucial. We suppose that
parties are only interested in winning the election and that they derive no
intrinsic utility from the platform chosen (i.e., no ideology). Moreover par-
ties are indifferent about the size of their majority: having a bare majority
they attach no utility to any extra vote (we relax this assumption in the next
section). Given that parties can choose among the same set of feasible poli-
cies, we can represent this electoral competition by a symmetric two-player
zero-sum game G = (T, T, U) where each party’s utility is
U(t1, t2) =



1 : t1Pt2
−1 : t2Pt1
0 : t1 = t2
This game, called the majority game, has a unique Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies if and only if there exists a Condorcet winner. Formally,
t∗ ∈ T is a Condorcet winner if and only if t∗Pt for all t ∈ T\{t∗}. In this
case, both parties choose the Condorcet winner as a strategy.
But we know that there is no Condorcet winner in the (unrestricted)
two-dimensional policy space. It follows that the game does not have any
equilibrium in pure strategies: each party could win the election if it knew
which policy is chosen by the other party.
22We rule out indifference since it is a very unlikely event.
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However, the absence of a Condorcet winner does not imply that any policy
is equally likely to be selected by any party. First, we do not expect any
party to select a Pareto dominated policy.
It is also unlikely that any party will play weakly dominated policies.
A policy t0 is weakly dominated by policy t00 if U (t0, t) ≤ U (t00, t) for all
t ∈ T , with a strict inequality for at least one t. Reformulated in our voting
context, t00 weakly dominating t0 means that t00 beats t0 as well as any policy
t that t0 can beat.
In the social choice literature, this dominance relation is also called the
covering relation (see Miller, 1980). Formally, given a tournament (T, P ), a
policy t0 ∈ T is covered whenever there exists some other policy t00 ∈ T such
that t00Pt0 and {t ∈ T : t0Pt} ⊆ {t ∈ T : t00Pt}. The set of options that are
not covered (for the majority preference relation P ) is called the uncovered
set, denoted by UC(T, P ). Since the covering relation is equivalent to the
weak dominance relation in our setting, the uncovered set is precisely the
set of weakly undominated pure strategies of the two-party zero-sum game
G = {T, T, U}. Given that any Pareto-dominated policy is covered, the
uncovered set is a subset of the Pareto set.23
A nice feature of the uncovered set is that it is not empty even when a
majority winner fails to exist. On the other hand, in absence of Condorcet
winner any uncovered policy will be defeated by other policies, even possibly
by policies not belonging to the uncovered set. Therefore the uncovered
set does not describe the policies that should be chosen. Instead it means
that parties can perform at least as well by restricting themselves to the
uncovered policies.
We can further restrict the set of interesting strategies by looking at the
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of this game.24 Laffond et al. (1993)
23 If t is Pareto-dominated by t0, t0 has a better position than t in every individual
preference ordering. Hence, using majority voting, t0 beats all the options that t beats,
which means that t0 covers t.
24See Laslier(2000) for an interpretation of electoral mixed strategies
14
have shown that the finite and symmetric majority game G = (T, T, U)
has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. They call the support of this
unique equilibrium the bipartisan set denoted BP (T,P ).25 It can be shown
that the bipartisan set is a subset of the uncovered set and thus a more
discriminating solution concept (see Banks et al., 1998). Furthermore, both
the uncovered set and the bipartisan set reduce to the Condorcet winner
whenever the latter exists.
Given these definitions, we can now compute the uncovered set and the
bipartisan set as a function of the abilities’ distribution. The results are re-
ported in Table 2 for the beta distribution with various parameters (α,β)26.
For each solution concept (including the Kramer cycle presented in Section
5), the first column gives the size of the solution set expressed in percentage
of the feasible set and the second column gives the proportion of the solution
set that is composed of (weakly) progressive tax schedules.
Table 2. Uncovered set (UC), Bipartisan set (BP) and Kramer cycle
for various beta(α,β)
Beta(α,β) UC BP Kramer
% %progr % %prog % %prog
1,1 16.9 64.8 5 76.2 2.62 45.4
1,2 0.7 0 0.7 0 0.7 0
2,2 4.8 85 1.7 100 1.7 100
2,3 15.7 80.3 6.4 96.3 2.86 91.7
2,4 18.3 79.2 7.9 93.9 1.4 66.7
2,5 9.3 71.8 4 88.2 1.7 28.6
2.5,2.5 3.3 100 1.7 100 0.9 100
2.5,3 10.5 84.1 3.1 100 1.2 100
2.5,4 8.6 94.4 4 100 1.4 100
2.5,5 3.3 100 2.1 100 1.4 100
3,3 1.7 100 1.2 100 0.9 100
3,4 3.1 100 1.7 100 0.9 100
3,5 8.3 100 2.1 100 1.2 100
25The bipartisan set is thus the set of options played with a strictly positive probability
at the equilibrium.
26We let a and b vary by increment of 0.05 respectively in [−b2 ,
1−b
2 ] and [0, 1].
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Table 2 suggests that the “flatness” and the “skewness” of the distribu-
tion of abilities determine whether progressive taxation is likely to emerge
in equilibrium. If both α and β equal one, the distribution of abilities is
uniform (with maximum flatness) and then both regressive and progressive
taxes can emerge in equilibrium (although progressivity is more likely). For
the beta parameters α = 1 and β = 2 the distribution becomes linearly de-
creasing and positively skewed. The shifting of probability mass to the low
ability levels makes this group sufficiently large to impose regressive taxes
(Recall that in our model the poor prefer marginal regressivity to induce
more effort and maximize tax revenues). A simultaneous increase in α and
β reduces the flatness of the distribution and produces a distribution more
tightly concentrated around the middle. This implies an increasingly large
middle income group who can thus impose progressivity as a way to reduce
its tax burden at the expense of the high-income group. Therefore for suf-
ficiently high α and β, the set of voting equilibria is confined to progressive
taxes. These results suggest that the prevalence of progressive taxation may
be due to the predominance of the middle class in the income distribution.
Table 2 also reveals that the uncovered set and the bipartisan set are
very discriminating solution concepts. This is in contrast to Epstein (1997)
who shows that for games of purely distributive politics the uncovered set
coincides approximately with the Pareto set which is typically very large.
Our results show that for the model used here (with distortionary taxation),
the uncovered set and the bipartisan set can give rather sharp predictions
on equilibrium outcomes.
In the next section we introduce repeated elections and study the tra-
jectory of vote-maximizing policies.
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5 Vote-maximizing trajectory
We use the dynamic version of the two-party electoral competition game
due to Kramer (1977). In this voting game, two political parties repeatedly
compete for the votes with the peculiarity that when a party is elected, it is
committed to keep the same political platform for the next election (reputa-
tion inertia).27 It is further assumed that parties are interested in maximiz-
ing the size of their majority (or net plurality defined as n(t1, t2)−n(t2, t1)),
and thus the opposition party will always select a policy which maximizes
its voting share given the incumbent’s policy. In absence of Condorcet win-
ner, both parties then alternate in office because each party can win the
election once it knows the policy chosen by the other party. This dynamic
voting process can be represented by the sequence of winning policies, which
Kramer calls a vote-maximizing trajectory (i.e., a sequence of policies such
that each policy along the sequence beats with a maximal number of votes
its predecessor). Formally, for any two adjacent policies (ti, ti+1) along the
sequence, ti+1 ∈ argmaxt∈T n(t, ti).
Using our model, we have simulated the Kramer trajectories for the
various parameters of the beta distribution of abilities. For each pair of
parameters, we get that (i) the Kramer trajectory converges to a cycle which
is independent of the starting point; and that (ii) a coalition of the rich and
the poor alternates with a coalition of the poor and the middle.
The results on the size and composition of the Kramer cycles are re-
ported in Table 2.28 According to these simulation results, progressive tax-
ation again emerges as the only possible voting outcome when there is a
predominance of the middle class in the distribution of abilities. Indeed the
27Note that this full commitment assumption stands in sharp contrast with the no-
commitment assumption in section 3. Therefore, besides presenting independent interest,
this dynamic electoral competition game enables us to test the robustness of our predic-
tions of the voting outcomes to the commitment assumption.
28a and b vary by increment of 0.025 respectively in [−b
2
, 1−b
2
] and [0, 1].
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beta distribution produces a Kramer cycle that contains only progressive
taxes when it is sufficiently concentrated around the middle (with α and β
high enough). Shifting the probability mass of individual abilities evenly
towards the extremes (α = β = 1) makes the vote maximizing trajectory
cycles evenly between regressive and progressive taxes; while a distribution
concentrated at low-abilities (α = 1; β = 2) induces a Kramer cycle that
only contains regressive taxes.
Kramer(1977) has also introduced theminmax set which is defined as the
set of policies whose maximal opposition is minimal. Formally,minmax(T ) =
argmintmaxt0 6=tn(t0, t). Kramer has demonstrated that for Euclidean pref-
erences the minmax set behaves like a basin of attraction in the sense that
any vote-maximizing trajectory converges to the minmax set. For the model
used here (with non-Euclidean preferences), we obtain that Kramer cycles
always pass through the minmax set (which may reduce to a singleton).
These results are of course only suggestive since they are based on some
simulations of a stylized model. But the fact that similar results emerge
from different voting games (see previous sections) leads us to believe that
they point out to something more general that would be worth examining
in future work.
6 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to determine the conditions under which (marginally)
progressive tax schedules emerge as a voting outcome. Given the potential
complexity of this problem we had to employ a highly stylized model with
quadratic taxation that nevertheless includes the salient aspects of voting
over non-linear income tax schedules, namely that taxes affect work incen-
tives and that individuals with different incomes have conflicting interests
over tax schedules. Although our modeling of disincentive effect of progres-
18
sivity creates a bias in favor of regressive tax schedules, vote cycles over
progressive and regressive taxes are almost inevitable in our setting.
In that context we have adopted three different ways to narrow down
the set of possible equilibria and to characterize equilibrium outcomes as a
function of the underlying distribution of abilities. The first approach re-
duces the policy space to the tax schedules that are ideal for some voter.
In doing so we have obtained a majority winner corresponding to the policy
preferred by the median ability individual which in general involves progres-
sive taxes. The second approach eliminates weakly dominated strategies,
reducing the set of possible voting equilibria to a relatively small subset.
We have shown that this subset contains only progressive taxes when the
distribution of abilities is sufficiently concentrated around the middle. The
third approach considers a sequential two-party competition game in which
parties alternatively propose tax schedules that maximize the size of their
majority. We have shown that this dynamic voting game will eventually
cycle on a small subset that again contains only progressive taxes when the
distribution of abilities is tightly concentrated around the middle.
We do not claim that the particular approaches examined here are the
“correct” ones in any sense. The point of this work is that each approach
captures a different aspect of reality. By predicting similar voting outcomes
it gives some credence to this simulation-based analysis of a highly stylized
model..
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